Review of D Nakanos Movie White Mans Burden essays

Review of D Nakanos Movie White Mans Burden essays The film "White Man's Burden is a deliberate attempt by the director, Desmond Nakano, to show what the effects of race and social status are on a person's beliefs, attitudes and behavior. The setting for the film is modern day America with a twist. In the film, blacks dominate economically, politically, and culturally, while whites represent the underclass. Touching upon issues that are prevalent in society today, the film gives the viewer a glimpse of what it's like to be a minority living in a society where the social norms and popular culture are defined by the ruling class. These issues are presented in ways that are both direct and indirect. Mr. Nakano uses his characters Thaddeus Taylor and Louis Pinnock to illustrate both sides of the racial and class divide. It is in the first scene that we meet the antagonist of the movie, Thaddeus Taylor. The character of Thaddeus is the archetype of what we perceive members of the establishment to be. He's a wealthy and influentia l businessman with a less than flattering opinion of those that are of a different race and socioeconomic status. The director uses this character to draw attention to the prejudices and assumptions that many members of the upper class have about the poor and minorities, particularly those living in the inner city. In the first scene, Thaddeus is having a dinner party with other well to do friends and family members and the conversation turn to one of Thaddeus' business deals. The deal involved the development of a shopping center in the inner city, which was burned down three months after it opened. One of the guests at the dinner party commented that it was a shame that the shopping center burnt down, because it would have provided jobs and infused money into a community that was economically deprived. Although the film didn't go into much detail, it is evident that those living in the neighborhood set the fire. Thaddeus comments that there is som...

Operation Ten-Go in World War II

Operation Ten-Go in World War II Operation Ten-Go took place on April 7, 1945, and was part of the Pacific Theater of World War II. With Allied forces landing on Okinawa in early 1945, the Japanese Combined Fleet was pressured into mounting an operation to aid in the islands defense. The plan put forward called for sending the superbattleship Yamato on a one-way voyage to the island. Arriving, it was to beach itself and be used as a massive shore battery until destroyed. Though many Japanese naval leaders considered Operation Ten-Go to be a waste of their remaining resources, it moved forward on April 6, 1945. Quickly spotted by Allied aircraft, Yamato and its consorts were subjected to a series of heavy air attacks that resulted in the loss of the battleship and most of its supporting ships. Though kamikaze strikes on the Allied ships off Okinawa caused some losses, only twelve men were lost in the attacks on the Japanese warships. Background By early 1945, having suffered crippling defeats at the Battles of Midway, Philippine Sea, and Leyte Gulf, the Japanese Combined Fleet was reduced to a small number of operational warships. Concentrated in the home islands, these remaining vessels were too few in number to directly engage the Allies fleets. As a final precursor to the invasion of Japan, Allied troops began attacking Okinawa on April 1, 1945. A month prior, realizing that Okinawa would be the Allies next target, Emperor Hirohito convened a meeting to discuss plans for the islands defense. The Japanese Plan Having listened to the armys plans to defend Okinawa through the use of kamikaze attacks and determined fighting on the ground, the Emperor demanded to how the navy planned to aid in the effort. Feeling pressured, the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Toyoda Soemu met with his planners and conceived Operation Ten-Go. A kamikaze-style operation, Ten-Go called for the battleship Yamato, the light cruiser Yahagi, and eight destroyers to fight their way through the Allied fleet and beach themselves on Okinawa. Japanese Battleship Yamato running sea trials on October 30, 1941. US Naval History Heritage Command Once ashore, the ships were to act as shore batteries until destroyed at which point their surviving crews were to disembark and fight as infantry. As the navys air arm had effectively been destroyed, no air cover would be available to support the effort. Though many, including the Ten-Go force commander Vice Admiral Seiichi Ito, felt that the operation was a waste of scant resources, Toyoda pushed it forward and preparations began. On March 29, Ito shifted his ships from Kure to Tokuyama. Arriving, Ito continued preparations but could not bring himself to order the operation to commence. On April 5, Vice Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka arrived in Tokuyama to convince the Combined Fleets commanders to accept Ten-Go. Upon learning the details, most sided with Ito believing that the operation was a futile waste. Kusaka persisted and told them that the operation would draw American aircraft away from the armys planned air attacks on Okinawa and that the Emperor was expecting the navy to make a maximum effort in the islands defense. Unable to resist the Emperors wishes, those in attendance reluctantly agreed to move forward with the operation. Operation Ten-Go Conflict: World War II (1939-1945)Dates: April 7, 1945Fleets Commanders:AlliesVice Admiral Marc Mitscher11 aircraft carriersJapanVice Admiral Seiichi Ito1 battleship, 1 light cruisers, 8 destroyersCasualties:Japanese: 4,137 killedAllies: 97 killed, 122 wounded The Japanese Sail Briefing his crews on the nature of the mission, Ito permitted any sailor who wished to stay behind to leave the ships (none did) and sent ashore new recruits, sick, and wounded. Through the day on April 6, intense damage-control drills were conducted and the ships fueled. Sailing at 4:00 p.m., Yamato and its consorts were spotted by the submarines USS Threadfin and USS Hackleback as they passed through the Bundo Strait. Unable to get into an attack position the submarines radioed in sighting reports. By dawn, Ito had cleared the Osumi Peninsula at the south end of Kyushu. Shadowed by American reconnaissance aircraft, Itos fleet was reduced on the morning of April 7 when the destroyer Asashimo developed engine trouble and turned back. At 10:00 a.m., Ito feinted west in an attempt to make the Americans think he was retreating. After steaming west for an hour and half, he returned to a southerly course after being spotted by two American PBY Catalinas. In effort to drive off the aircraft, Yamato opened fire with its 18-inch guns using special beehive anti-aircraft shells. U.S. Navy SB2C Helldiver dive bombers attack Yamato during Operation Ten-Go, April 7, 1945. U.S. Navy History and Heritage Command The Americans Attack Aware of Itos progress, the eleven carriers of Vice Admiral Marc Mitschers Task Force 58 began launching several waves of aircraft around 10:00 a.m. In addition, a force of six battleships and two large cruisers was sent north in case air strikes failed to stop the Japanese. Flying north from Okinawa, the first wave spotted Yamato shortly after noon. As the Japanese lacked air cover, the American fighters, dive bombers, and torpedo planes patiently set up their attacks. Commencing around 12:30 p.m., the torpedo bombers focused their attacks on Yamatos port side to increase the chances of the ship capsizing. As the first wave struck, Yahagi was hit in the engine room by a torpedo. Dead in the water, the light cruiser was struck by six more torpedoes and twelve bombs in the course of the battle before sinking at 2:05 p.m. While Yahagi was being crippled, Yamato took a torpedo and two bomb hits. Though not effecting its speed, a large fire erupted aft of the battleships superstructure. The second and third waves of aircraft launched their attacks between 1:20 PM and 2:15 p.m. Maneuvering for its life, the battleship was hit by at least eight torpedoes and as many as fifteen bombs. Japanese battleship Yamato explodes during Operation Ten-Go, April 7, 1945. U.S. Navy History and Heritage Command End of a Behemoth Losing power, Yamato began listing severely to port. Due to the destruction of the ships water damage-control station, the crew was unable to counter-flood specially designed spaces on the starboard side. At 1:33 p.m., Ito ordered the starboard boiler and engine rooms flooded in an effort to right the ship. This effort killed the several hundred crewmen working in those spaces and reduced the ships speed to ten knots. At 2:02 p.m., Ito ordered the mission canceled and the crew to abandon ship. Three minutes later, Yamato began to capsize. Around 2:20 p.m., the battleship rolled completely and began sink before being torn open by a massive explosion. Four of the Japanese destroyers were also sunk during the battle. Aftermath Operation Ten-Go cost the Japanese between 3,700–4,250 dead as well as Yamato, Yahagi, and four destroyers. American losses in the air attacks were a mere 12 killed and ten aircraft. Operation Ten-Go was the Imperial Japanese Navys last significant action of World War II and its few remaining ships would have little effect during the final weeks of the war. The operation had minimal effect on the Allied operations around Okinawa and the island was declared secure on June 21, 1945.